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4 See, e.g., Rev. Rul. 93-30, I.R.B. 1993-16, 4.  See also Ltr.
Rul. 8106082, Nov. 18, 1980 (ruling on Wyoming enactment).
But see Rev. Rul. 93-38, I.R.B. 1993-21, 4 (limited liability
company (LLC) formed under Del. Code tit. 6, §§ 18-101 et
seq. may be taxed as corporation or partnership because Act
allows LLC agreement to provide for centralized management
and continuation of company without consent of members
after transfer of member’s interest).
5 See Va. Code Ann. § 13.1-1008.
6 Kan. Stat. Ann. §§ 17-7603(a), 17-7604(q).
7 Utah Code Ann. § 48-2b-104.
8 Iowa Code § 9H.3A.
9 E.g., Iowa Code §§ 490A.128, 490A.301.
10 E.g., Wyo. Stat. § 17-15-107(a)(ii).
11 E.g., Iowa Code § 490A.1301.
INCOME TAX TREATMENT OF HEDGING
The United States Tax Court has decided a case of
substantial importance to the tax treatment of commodity
hedges. The issue of the proper handling of hedge
transaction gains and losses has been a matter of concern
since issuance of a letter by Stuart L. Brown, Associate
Chief Counsel (Domestic), IRS, to Henry Bahn, USDA,
regarding the Options Pilot Program on January 27, 1993.
(See pp. 32 and 80 supra.)
In the Tax Court case, the Federal National Mortgage
Ass’n had hedged debentures and mortgages with short
sales of Treasury securities.  Losses were deducted as
ordinary losses. I.R.S. objected, citing Arkansas Best Corp.
v. Comm’r, 485 U.S. 212 (1988), for the proposition that the
gains and losses were properly capital transactions.
The Tax Court held that the FNMA transactions were
hedges and that disposition of the hedges resulted in
ordinary gains and losses.
The court noted that the transactions were meant to
offset the risk of change in interest rates and were,
therefore, true hedges. In response to the argument that
FNMA had not offset all of its risk, an argument sometimes
made with commodity futures transactions, the court said,
“A taxpayer is not required to negate its entire risk, nor
must it hedge every transaction in order to lock in a
particular return, since hedges by their very nature are
meant to avoid risk of loss (similar to insurance), but
not necessarily all risk to which a taxpayer is
exposed.”
In deciding that the losses on the hedges were ordinary
losses rather than capital losses, the court concluded that
short positions as well as long positions could reduce price
risk and that it was not necessary for ordinary gain and loss
treatment for the hedge to be in the same asset that the
taxpayers owns or intends to acquire. The court explained
that for the hedging position to be eligible for ordinary gain
or loss treatment, the hedging transactions must have been
integrally related to the purchasing and holding of the assets
hedged. In the FNMA case, the court concluded that the
hedges bore a close enough relationship to FNMA’s
mortgages to be excluded from the definition of a capital
asset.
Another case is still pending before the Court of Federal
Claims, Cather v. U.S., which involves hedging of beef
cattle and feed grains, including the use of various options
strategies (puts and calls).  The FNMA case provides a
good deal of assurance that commodity hedges, including
short sales, will produce ordinary gain or loss treatment.
Federal Nat’l Mortgage Ass’n, 100 T.C. No. 36 (1993).
CASES, REGULATIONS AND STATUTES
by Robert P. Achenbach, Jr.
BANKRUPTCY
    GENERAL   
ABSOLUTE PRIORITY RULE. The debtors owned a
farm under a sole proprietorship and in their Chapter 11 plan
proposed to contribute their labor and exempt property to
the farm business to satisfy the absolute priority rule.  The
debtors' attorney also agreed to be paid out of future farm
earnings instead of estate property.  The debtors claimed that
because the farm business had little or no "going concern"
value, the debtors did not retain any interest of value.  The
court rejected this argument, noting that the U.S. Supreme
Court in In re Ahlers, 485 U.S. 197 (1988), held that the
retained control over the business and possible future
earnings from the business were not sufficient retained
interests to invoke the absolute priority rule.  The court held
that there was no new value exception to the absolute
priority rule, but even under such an exception, the debtors'
contribution must be necessary for the reorganization and
must be substantial and exceed the value of the debtors'
retained interests in the business.  The debtors were held not
to have met the burden of showing their entitlement to the
exception.  Unruh v. Rushville State Bank, 987 F.2d 1506
(10th Cir. 1993), aff’g, 135 B.R. 410 (D. Kan. 1991), aff'g,
108 B.R. 284 (Bankr. D. Kan. 1989).
EXEMPTIONS-ALM § 13.03[4].*
AVOIDABLE LIENS. The debtor sought to avoid a
judgment lien to the extent the lien impaired the debtor’s
homestead exemption. The judgment was entered to enforce
an otherwise unavoidable student loan. The court held that
the student loan judgment lien was avoidable to the extent it
impaired the homestead exemption. In re Evaul, 152 B.R.
31 (Bankr. W.D. N.Y. 1993).
HOMESTEAD. The Bankruptcy Court had ruled that the
debtor’s entire 32 acre residence was exempt as a rural
homestead because Tex. Prop. Code § 41.002(c) defined a
homestead as rural if it did not receive municipal utilities or
fire or police protection. The District Court reversed and
remanded, holding that the statute applied only in
foreclosure situations and did not overturn Texas common
law which established various factors for determining the
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rural status of a homestead. In re Davis, 152 B.R. 133 (S.D.
Tex. 1992).
The debtor was allowed a homestead exemption for a
semi-truck cab which was equipped with a bunk bed,
refrigerator, television, radio, heater and air conditioning but
did not have a bathroom or cooking facilities. The debtor
had no other residence. In re Laube, 152 B.R. 260 (Bankr.
W.D. Wis. 1993).
STATE OPT-OUT PROVISION. The Arkansas
legislature repealed the Arkansas opt-out provision to allow
debtors to choose either the state or federal exemptions. A
creditor objected to the debtor’s use of the federal
exemptions, arguing that the repeal was an adoption of the
federal exemptions as state law and the federal exemption
for insurance proceeds violated the state constitution limit
on personal exemptions. The court held that the opt-out
election was revocable and that the repeal of the opt-out
election did not effect an adoption of the federal exemptions
as state law but merely reinstated the federal rule for choice
of state or federal exemptions by the debtor unless a state
has opted-out of the federal exemptions. In re Criswell, 152
B.R. 264 (Bankr. E.D. Ark. 1992).
WILD CARD. The debtor sought to claim a one-third
remainder interest in a farm as exempt under the Illinois
“wild card” exemption. The court held that the “wild card”
exemption could not be used to exempt real property. In re
Woodworth, 152 B.R. 258 (Bankr. C.D. Ill. 1993).
    CHAPTER 12
ADMINISTRATIVE EXPENSES. After the Chapter
12 debtors sought discharge after completion of the plan, a
creditor sought discovery and review of the debtors' records
to determine whether all disposable income was paid. As a
result of this effort, an additional $19,000 was paid to the
trustee for distribution to unsecured creditors. The creditor
petitioned for recovery of its expenses, over $17,000, in
pursuing the recovery of these funds. The trustee argued that
because the creditor had not sought prior court approval for
its actions and because such recovery was not allowed in
Chapter 12 cases, under Sections 503(b)(3)(B) and
503(b)(3)(D), the creditor should not be entitled to recover
the costs. The court held that the fees were not recoverable
in a Chapter 12 case. In re Peterson, 152 B.R. 612 (D. S.D.
1993), rev’g, 145 B.R. 631 (Bankr. D. S.D. 1992).
AUTOMATIC STAY. Prior to the filing of the
bankruptcy case, the creditor filed for foreclosure of a
mortgage on the debtor’s farm and the foreclosure judgment
was entered by default after the debtor failed to appear. The
foreclosure documents were sent to the wrong post office
box but the debtor received personal service of court
documents. The final default judgment notice also stated
that the date of judgment would be July 6 but the hearing
was actually held July 20, although the debtor appeared on
neither date. The creditor sought relief from the automatic
stay to complete the foreclosure process and the debtor
resisted, arguing that the judgment should have been set
aside because of the irregularities. The court held that
because the foreclosure judgment was entered pre-petition
with only harmless irregularities, the mortgage relationship
was dissolved and the creditor would be granted relief from
the automatic stay. In re Berg, 152 B.R. 289 (Bankr. D.
S.D. 1993).
     CHAPTER 13
ELIGIBILITY-ALM § 13.03.*  The debtor had a
$106,000 unsecured claim filed by the IRS and the trustee
objected to the Chapter 13 plan because the debtor’s
unsecured claims exceeded the $100,000 eligibility amount
for Chapter 13. The debtor argued that the claims, resulting
from Tax Court judgments, were partly unliquidated
penalties which should not have been allowed as claims in
the bankruptcy case. The court held that the Bankruptcy
Court had no authority to question the Tax Court judgments
and dismissed the case. Matter of Hammers, 998 F.2d 32
(5th Cir. 1993).
   FEDERAL TAXATION    
   ALLOCATION OF PLAN PAYMENTS FOR TAXES.
The debtor’s Chapter 11 plan provided for payments on its
employment tax claims first to the trust fund portion of the
claims before payment of interest and penalties. The debtor
argued that the allocation was necessary for a successful
reorganization because if the corporate officers remained
liable for the trust fund taxes, the officers would not
continue to seek reorganization of the corporation. The court
held that the allocation was necessary for a successful
reorganization and would be allowed. In re R.L. Himes &
Assoc., Inc., 152 B.R. 198 (S.D. Ohio 1993).
The debtor sought an amendment to the Chapter 13 plan
to provide that payments to the IRS be allocated first to the
debtor’s income tax liability and then to the debtor’s
employment tax liability. The debtor argued that the
allocation would benefit everyone involved because the
allocation would result in a third party paying more of the
employment taxes and making all payments faster. The
court held that the plan could be so amended. In re Klaska,
152 B.R. 248 (Bankr. C.D. Ill. 1993).
CLAIMS. The debtor objected to the IRS claim for
taxes, claiming that an amended return was filed in 1989
which lowered the taxes for 1984 by electing income
averaging. The debtor had no proof of mailing and the
amended returns were sent by ordinary mail. The debtor
argued that the court had discretion under Section 505 to
determine the 1984 taxes by allowing the income averaging
election. The court declined to exercise the discretionary
authority because (1) the only claims were secured claims
and the unsecured tax claims and (2) the judgment sought by
the debtor would only benefit the debtor and not any
unsecured creditors. In re Swan, 152 B.R. 28 (Bankr. W.D.
N.Y. 1992).
DISCHARGE-ALM § 13.03[6].*  In 1981, the debtor
had filed a W-4 form listing 40 exemptions.  In 1987, the
debtor filed returns for 1982 through 1985 claiming three
exemptions.  The debtor filed bankruptcy more than three
years after the returns were filed and claimed the taxes owed
as dischargeable.  The IRS argued that the taxes were not
dischargeable because the false W-4 form, the late filed
returns and the filing of bankruptcy just after the taxes
became dischargeable were an attempt to evade taxes.  The
Bankruptcy Court granted summary judgment for the debtor,
holding that the circumstances did not prove a willful
attempt to evade taxes and that the taxes were dischargeable.
The District Court reversed and remanded, holding that the
debtor’s actions left questions of fact as to a willful attempt
to evade taxes. In re Peterson, 152 B.R. 329 (D. Wyo.
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1993), rev’g and rem’g, 132 B.R. 68 (Bankr. D. Wyo.
1991).
The debtor had failed to file accurate income tax returns
for several years in an attempt to recover losses incurred
from an erroneous but uncompensable government seizure
of the debtor’s business assets. In defending the actions in
the Tax Court, the debtor argued that the tax returns were
improperly filed because of a mental illness resulting from
the belief that the government was persecuting the debtor.
The Tax Court rejected the mental illness defense and held
that the debtor willfully failed to file the proper returns. The
Bankruptcy Court held that the Tax Court decision was res
judicata on the issue of willfulness; therefore, the tax
liability resulting from the improper returns was
nondischargeable. In re Lilley, 152 B.R. 715 (Bankr. E.D.
Pa. 1993).
NET OPERATING LOSSES.  The debtor made the
election to carry forward net operating losses on pre-
bankruptcy and post-bankruptcy income tax returns.  The
appellate court held that the bankruptcy trustee could avoid
the election so that the trustee could carry back the NOL for
refunds. On remand, the Bankruptcy court held that the
prepetition NOL election was not made with intent to
defraud creditors because the debtor relied on the advice of
accountants in making the election solely for tax planning
purposes. The court also held that the post-petition NOL
election was not improper because such an election is a
normal business decision. In re Russell, 93-1 U.S. Tax Cas.
(CCH) ¶ 50,309 (W.D. Ark. 1993), on rem. from, 927 F.2d
413 (8th Cir. 1991).
PENALTIES. The debtor was assessed for post-petition
federal employment and unemployment taxes and was
assessed interest and penalties. The debtor argued that the
interest and penalties on the taxes which were not required
to be withheld were discharged by the bankruptcy case. The
court held that all interest and penalties were not discharged.
In re Paulson, 152 B.R. 46 (Bankr. W.D. Pa. 1993).
TAX LIENS. The court held that the debtor’s vested
interest in a pension plan was property to which a tax lien
could attach. In re Raihl, 152 B.R. 615 (Bankr. 9th Cir.
1993).
FEDERAL ESTATE AND
GIFT TAX
CHARITABLE DEDUCTION-ALM § 5.04[4].* The
decedent’s will provided authority for the executor to make
distributions from the estate to persons who contributed to
the decedent’s care during life. The remainder of the estate
was to pass to two named charitable organizations. The
court held that the estate was not allowed a charitable
deduction for the amounts which actually passed to the
organizations because the amount of the charitable gifts was
not ascertainable at the decedent’s death since the executor
had unlimited authority to make distributions to persons who
cared for the decedent. Est. of Marine v. Comm’r, 990
F.2d 136 (4th Cir. 1993), aff’g, 97 T.C. 368 (1991).
The taxpayer donated wooded lakefront property to a
tax-exempt organization which was required by the transfer
agreement to conserve the property in its natural state for
public recreation. The transfer agreement reserved for the
taxpayer an interest in subsurface oil, gas and mineral rights
but restricted extraction to that which would cause only
temporary, localized impact on the property. The IRS ruled
that the transfer was a qualified conservation contribution
eligible for the gift tax charitable contribution deduction.
Ltr. Rul. 9318027, Feb. 5, 1993.
CLAIMS AGAINST ESTATE.  The decedent made
several gifts of money to the decedent's children who
transferred the money back to the decedent in exchange for a
non-interest bearing note payable in 25 years or upon the
death of the decedent.  The decedent reported the gifts on
federal gift tax returns.  The court held that the estate could
not deduct the notes as claims against the estate because the
notes did not represent bona fide debts contracted for full
and adequate consideration.  Est. of Flandreau v. Comm'r,
93-1 U.S. Tax Cas. (CCH) (2d Cir. 1993), aff’g, T.C.
Memo. 1992-173.
DEDUCTIONS-ALM § 5.04.* The decedent was the
sole shareholder of a corporation which leased real property
from an unrelated third party. The decedent had personally
guaranteed the rent for the corporation to the extent of
$75,000 for 1991. After the decedent died, the corporation
ceased operations and defaulted on the 1991 rent and the
landlord filed a claim against the estate for $75,000 on the
guarantee. The IRS ruled that the estate could deduct the
post-death payment of the $75,000 because the claim was
contingent at the date of death. Ltr. Rul. 9321004, Feb. 16,
1993.
GENERATION SKIPPING TRANSFER TAX-ALM
§ 5.04[6].* Under one trust agreement, two trusts were
formed one each for the grantor’s children. All parties to the
trusts agreed to change the situs of the trusts to another state
and to substitute a corporate trustee. The parties also agreed
to amend the trust to allow the grantor to acquire trust assets
in exchange for assets of equal value. The IRS ruled that the
change of situs and trustee did not subject the trusts to
GSTT. The IRS refused to rule on whether the amendment
to the trust would cause the trust corpus or income to be
included in the grantor’s gross estate. Ltr. Rul. 9318019,
Feb. 4, 1993.
GROSS ESTATE-ALM § 5.02.* The decedent’s estate
included property in which the decedent had received a life
interest from the estate of the decedent’s predeceased spouse
and for which the predeceased spouse’s estate had claimed
as QTIP. The decedent’s estate excluded the QTIP property,
arguing that the property was not eligible QTIP because the
trustee had discretion as to how often to make distributions.
The court found that the trust required reasonable
distributions, which the court interpreted as at least
quarterly.  The court also held that the estate was improperly
attempting to revoke the irrevocable QTIP election. Est. of
Cavenaugh v. Comm’r, 100 T.C. No. 27 (1993).
INCOME IN RESPECT OF DECEDENT. the
taxpayer established a revocable trust with the taxpayer as
beneficiary. The trust corpus consisted of corporate stock
and the grantor entered into an agreement with the trustees
to borrow additional stock from the corporation and to place
an order for a short sale of the stock. The short sale was
entered into as a protection against loss of trust corpus from
devaluation of the stock. The IRS ruled that if the taxpayer
dies before the short sale is closed, any income resulting
from the short sale would not be income in respect of
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decedent and the basis of the stock would equal its fair
market value. Ltr. Rul. 9319005, Feb. 4, 1993.
The decedent’s estate included the decedent’s interest in
a profit sharing plan which provided for distribution of
payments to the surviving spouse with a contingent
remainder to the children. The surviving spouse filed a
timely qualified disclaimer of 44.3 percent of the profit
sharing plan, which passed to the children under the plan
provisions. The IRS ruled that the post-death income was
income in respect of decedent and that the surviving
spouse’s disclaimer of the 44.3 percent interest was effective
to pass the tax liability for the income to the children. Ltr.
Rul. 9319029, Feb. 12, 1993.
MARITAL DEDUCTION-ALM § 5.04[3].* The
decedent’s 1978 will bequeathed an amount of the estate to a
marital trust equal to the “maximum allowable marital
deduction.” The decedent died in 1983 without changing the
will. In 1987, Tennessee passed a statute allowing such
bequests to qualify for the unlimited marital deduction if a
state probate court determined that to be the intention of the
decedent. The court held that the statute was insufficient to
qualify the bequest for the unlimited marital deduction
because the statute itself did not construe the bequest, but
allowed a court to do the construing. Hall v. U.S., 93-1 U.S.
Tax Cas. (CCH) ¶ 60,135 (M.D. Tenn. 1993).
The decedent’s will bequeathed the entire estate to the
surviving spouse and directed that the estate taxes be paid
from the estate residue or other available funds. The
executor paid the taxes only from an intervivos trust
established by the decedent, claiming that the Ohio
apportionment statute required such payment. The court held
that because the decedent’s will directed payment of the
taxes from the estate, the executor’s apportionment of the
taxes entirely to the trust was improper; therefore the
amount of the marital deduction should have been reduced
by the estate’s portion of the taxes. Est. of Swallen v.
Comm’r, T.C. Memo. 1993-149.
The decedent’s estate included stock which passed to a
trust for the surviving spouse qualifying as QTIP. The estate
sold the stock to the corporation’s ESOP and claimed a
deduction under I.R.C. § 2057 (repealed in 1988). The court
held that the estate could not claim a deduction for the stock
sale to the extent that the value of the stock was already used
for the marital deduction. Est. of Reeves v. Comm’r, 100
T.C. No. 28 (1993).
The taxpayer established a trust for the taxpayer’s
resident alien spouse which was revocable until the
taxpayer’s death.  The trust was a qualified domestic trust
and was to be funded with the remainder interest in the
taxpayer’s IRA. The trust provided that the annual
distributions to the surviving spouse must equal the greater
of the income attributable from the IRA or the IRA balance
divided by the life expectancy of the surviving spouse. The
IRS ruled that the trust must be irrevocable as of the
taxpayer’s required beginning date in order for the taxpayer
to elect to have the minimum required distribution from the
IRA determined by and distributed over a period not to
exceed the joint life expectancy of the taxpayer and
surviving spouse. The IRS also ruled that the surviving
spouse’s interest in the trust was eligible for the marital
deduction but the surviving spouse could not elect to have
the IRA treated as owned by the spouse. Ltr. Rul. 9321032,
Feb. 24, 1993.
The taxpayer established an intervivos irrevocable  trust
for the taxpayer’s spouse which would be funded at the
taxpayer’s death with the taxpayer’s IRA. The trust provided
that the annual distributions to the surviving spouse must
equal the greater of the income from the IRA or the IRA
balance divided by the life expectancy of the surviving
spouse. The IRS ruled that the trust would be QTIP eligible
for the marital deduction. Ltr. Rul. 9321035, Feb. 24, 1993.
POWER OF APPOINTMENT. At the decedent’s
death, the decedent was trustee and beneficiary of a trust
established by the decedent’s predeceased spouse. The
decedent had the power as trustee to distribute trust corpus
to the decedent or the decedent’s children for their “support,
comfort, happiness and welfare.” The IRS ruled that the
trust corpus was included in the decedent’s gross estate
because the decedent held a general power of appointment
over the trust corpus not subject to an ascertainable standard.
Ltr. Rul. 9318002, Jan. 15, 1993.
The decedent had received property under a predeceased
spouse’s will in 1938. The will provided that the decedent
could use the property free of accountability but provided
for passing of the property to the children at the decedent’s
death.  A bank had been appointed conservator of one of the
children and the bank filed a disclaimer of that child’s
interest in the decedent’s residuary bequest. The IRS ruled
that the decedent had a general power of appointment over
the property received from the predeceased spouse, and
because the interest was created prior to 1942, the property
would not be included in the decedent’s estate unless the
decedent exercised the power by will or otherwise disposed
of the property as if the property was owned by the
decedent. The IRS also ruled that the disclaimer was
effective. Ltr. Rul. 9318020, Feb. 4, 1993.
TRANSFERS WITHIN THREE YEARS OF
DEATH-ALM § 5.02[2].*   The decedent had created a
revocable trust with the decedent as sole beneficiary. The
trustee was directed to make distributions of income and
corpus to the decedent “or otherwise” as the decedent
directed. The decedent made written requests to the trustee
for “gifts” to third persons within three years of death. The
IRS ruled that the transfers were includible in the decedent’s
gross estate. Ltr. Rul. 9318004, Jan. 22, 1993.
TRUSTS-ALM § Ch. 8.*   The decedent was a
remainder beneficiary of a trust established by a predeceased
parent. The trust provided that the trust passed to the
decedent “or her heirs per stirpes” at the death of the parent.
The trustee decided to distribute the decedent’s share of the
trust in ten annual payments. The decedent’s estate argued
that the decedent’s interest in the trust was a life estate and
any remaining trust corpus would not be included in the
decedent’s estate. The court held that the trust corpus was
includible in the decedent’s gross estate and that the
trustee’s method of distribution did not make the interest a
life estate.  Stack v. U.S., 93-1 U.S. Tax Cas. (CCH) ¶
60,136 (D. Minn. 1993).
The decedent’s will created a seven-year trust with equal
shares for five heirs. The trust provided that if a beneficiary
died before the trust terminated, one half of that
beneficiary’s share passed to that heir’s surviving spouse
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and one-half passed to that heir’s heirs. One beneficiary
predeceased the decedent and that share was split between a
surviving spouse and child. After the trust terminates, 75
percent of the trust corpus passed to the beneficiaries and 25
percent passed to 17 other heirs or their heirs. The IRS ruled
that the six current beneficiaries’ shares and the 25 percent
remainder share could be treated as separate trusts. Ltr. Rul.
9321034, Feb. 24, 1993.
VALUATION-ALM § 5.02[3][a].* The court accepted
the estate’s valuation of the decedent’s interests in oil and
gas mineral properties because the valuation accounted for
several factors which a potential buyer would consider. The
IRS valuation method of using the average of the past three
year’s income was rejected as too simplistic. Est. of Smith
v. Comm’r, T.C. Memo. 1993-236.
The decedent , a sole shareholder of a corporation,
entered into an agreement with the corporation to redeem 50
of 52 shares for a promissory note for $700,000. This
transaction had a significant impact on the corporation’s
earnings and cash value. Concurrent with the agreement, the
decedent transferred two shares to a son and his spouse for
$26,000. The IRS argued that the son’s purchase of the stock
was a gift because the company was worth $800,000 on the
date of the transfer. The court held that the redemption
agreement reduced the value of the company to $500,000
and the cost of the redemption agreement, $700,000,
reduced the company to insolvency and made the son’s
purchase price of the stock more than the stock’s value;
therefore, no gift occurred. Est. of Bruce v. Comm’r, T.C.
Memo. 1993-244.
The taxpayer owned 47 percent of the common stock of
a rural electric company with 3 percent of the stock owned
by the taxpayer’s children and 50 percent owned by a trust
of which the taxpayer was the sole beneficiary with limited
right to corpus distribution. The taxpayer recapitalized the
company, issuing one share of common and one share of
preferred stock for each existing share. The preferred stock
would have a dividend of 8 percent but no voting,
liquidation, put, call or conversion rights. The IRS ruled that
the value of each class of stock would be determined by
subtracting the value of all family-held senior equity
interests from the market value of all family-held interests in
the entity and allocating the remaining value to the
subordinate family-held equity interests. Ltr. Rul. 9321046,
Feb. 25, 1993.
CORRECTION. On p. 82 supra, Ltr. Rul. 93150  19  , Jan
13, 1993 should be Ltr. Rul. 93150   10  , Jan. 13, 1993.
FEDERAL INCOME
TAXATION
COOPERATIVES-ALM § 14.03.*  A nonexempt
cooperative which manufactured and distributed fertilizer
for its patrons had interest income from investment of cash
in money market instruments having a maturity of 30 days
or less and instruments with maturity over 30 days.  The
District Court held that the interest from instruments with
maturities of 30 days or less was patronage sourced income
but that the instruments with longer maturity were not
because the cooperative had no business purpose for the
longer term investments. The appellate court modified the
holding by also allowing the interest from longer notes as
patronage sourced income because the longer notes were
also part of the cooperative’s money management process.
CF Industries, Inc. v. Comm'r, 93-1 U.S. Tax Cas.
(CCH) ¶ 50,313 (7th Cir. 1993), aff’g and modifying, T.C.
Memo. 1991-568.
DEPRECIATION-ALM § 4.03[4] A corporation
purchased an estate for years in farmland and the
shareholders purchased the remainder interests. The court
held that the corporation’s interest was amortizable because
the separate interests were purchased with separate funds.
Richard Hansen Land, Inc. v. Comm’r, T.C. Memo.
1993-248.
FAMILY ESTATE TRUSTS-ALM § 8.08.* .  The
taxpayers transferred a veterinary practice and cattle
business to a trust with the taxpayer and spouse as
beneficiaries and trustees. The court held that the trust had
no economic substance and all trust income was chargeable
to the taxpayers, where the taxpayer retained control over all
assets and performed no trustee duties. Paulson v. Comm'r,
93-1 U.S. Tax Cas. (CCH) ¶ 50,271 (8th Cir. 1993), aff’g,
T.C. Memo. 1991-508.
FUTURES CONTRACTS. The taxpayer invested in
commodity futures contracts and challenged the
constitutionality of I.R.C. § 1256 which required recognition
of taxable gain on the contracts which were held at the end
of the taxable year, even though the contracts had not been
sold. The court upheld the constitutionality of the statute
because the taxpayer could receive the gain on the marked-
to-market contracts at any time. Murphy v. U.S., 93-1 U.S.
Tax Cas. (CCH) ¶ 50,270 (9th Cir. 1993).
HOME OFFICE EXPENSE-ALM § 4.03[13].* An art
teacher was denied deductions for home office related
expenses for a home art studio because the principal place of
business was the school where the taxpayer was employed
and the home studio was not maintained for the employer’s
convenience. In addition, the taxpayer could not deduct the
cost of art supplies because the sale of the art was not sought
in a reasonable, commercial manner. Bowles v. Comm’r,
T.C. Memo. 1993-222.
INTEREST RATE.  The IRS has announced that for the
period July 1, 1993 through September 30, 1993, the interest
rate paid on tax overpayments remains at 6 percent and for
underpayments remains at 7 percent. The interest rate for
underpayments by large corporations remains at 9 percent.
Rev. Rul. 93-40, I.R.B. 1993-23.
INVESTMENT TAX CREDIT-ALM § 4.04.*  The
taxpayers purchased a certified historic building in 1982 and
developed a 60 month plan for complete rehabilitation of the
building. The building had a basis of $2 million and the
1982 rehabilitation expenditures were $500,000 for which
the taxpayers claimed investment tax credit. The court held
that because the expenditures in 1982 had not yet exceeded
the building’s basis, the ITC was not allowed in 1982. The
court noted that the ITC would be available in the taxable
year of the completion of the 60 month plan and any excess
ITC could be carried back. Ford v. U.S., 93-1 U.S. Tax
Cas. (CCH) ¶ 50,268 (11th Cir. 1993).
PARTNERSHIPS-ALM § 7.03.*
DISTRIBUTIONS. The general partners of a limited
partnership were considered to have received distributions
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from the partnership to the extent the partnership funds were
used to pay for a new home for the partners which was not
transferred to the partnership  White v. Comm'r, 93-1 U.S.
Tax Cas. (CCH) ¶ 50,273 (10th Cir. 1993), aff’g, T.C.
Memo. 1991-552.
LIMITED LIABILITY COMPANY. The IRS has ruled
that a limited liability company (LLC) formed under the
Delaware Limited Liability Company Act, Del. Code tit. 6,
§§ 18-101 et seq., may be taxed as a corporation or a
partnership because the Act allows the LLC agreement to
provide for centralized management and continuation of the
company without consent of the members after the transfer
of a member’s interest. Thus, if the LLC agreement does not
provide for these occurrences, the LLC may be taxed as a
partnership. Rev. Rul. 93-38, I.R.B. 1993-21, 4.
RETIREMENT PLANS. The U.S. Supreme Court has
ruled that the contribution by an employer of unencumbered
real property to a defined benefit pension plan in satisfaction
of the employer’s minimum funding obligation is a
prohibited transaction under I.R.C. § 4975(c)(1)(A).
Commissioner v. Keystone Consolidated Indus., Inc., 93-
1 U.S. Tax Cas. (CCH) ¶ 50,298 (S. Ct. 1993), rev’g, 951
F.2d 76 (5th Cir. 1992).
S CORPORATIONS-ALM § 7.02[3][c].*
ONE CLASS OF STOCK. An S corporation entered into
a split dollar life insurance agreement under which the
corporation would pay the premiums on a life insurance
policy on the life of a shareholder with the shareholder
reimbursing the corporation to the extent the premium
conferred an economic benefit on the shareholder. The IRS
ruled that the agreement did not created a second class of
stock  Ltr. Rul. 9318007, Jan. 29, 1993.
TERMINATION. The IRS waived as inadvertent the
termination of an S corporation’s election where the
corporation’s accountant failed to pay the Section 1375 tax
resulting from three years of passive investment income in
excess of 25 percent of gross receipts. Ltr. Rul. 9318006,
Jan. 25, 1993.
SALE OR EXCHANGE. The decedent bequeathed a
residence to two surviving children as tenants in common.
The children divided the property with each taking a fee
interest in one-half of the property. The IRS ruled that the
division of the property was not a sale or exchange subject
to taxable gain under I.R.C. § 1001(a) or (c). Ltr. Rul.
9319032, Feb. 12, 1993.
SAFE HARBOR INTEREST RATES
June 1993
Annual Semi-annual Quarterly Monthly
Short-term
AFR 3.62 3.59 3.57 3.56
110% AFR 3.99 3.95 3.93 3.92
120% AFR 4.36 4.31 4.29 4.27
Mid-term
AFR 5.33 5.26 5.23 5.20
110% AFR 5.87 5.79 5.75 5.72
120% AFR 6.41 6.31 6.26 6.23
Long-term
AFR 6.47 6.37 6.32 6.29
110% AFR 7.13 7.01 6.95 6.91
120% AFR 7.79 7.64 7.57 7.52
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